Abstract. In this paper, we present the pseudo-collision, pseudo-second-preimage and pseudo-preimage attacks on the SHA-3 candidate algorithm Luffa. The pseudocollisions and pseudo-second-preimages can be found easily by computing the inverse of the message injection function at the beginning of Luffa. We explain in details the pseudo-preimage attacks. For Luffa-224/256, given the hash value, only 2 iteration computations are needed to get a pseudo-preimage. For Luffa-384, finding a pseudo-preimage needs about 2 64 iteration computations with 2 67 bytes memory by the extended generalized birthday attack. For Luffa-512, the complexity is 2 128 iteration computations with 2 132 bytes memory. It is noted that, we can find the pseudo-collision pairs and the pseudo-second images only changing a few different bits of initial values. That is directly converted to the forgery attack on NMAC in related key cases.
Introduction
A cryptographic hash function is defined as a function that computes a fixed size message digest from arbitrary size messages. It has been widely used as a fundamental primitive in many cryptographic schemes and protocols, such as electronic signature, authentication of messages, electronic commerce and bit commitment, etc. In the past years, the cryptanalysis of hash functions has achieved tremendous progress with the construction of collisions. In particular, Wang et al. proposed new techniques to find efficiently collisions on the main hash functions from the MD4 family (e.g., MD4 [8] , RIPEMD [8] , MD5 [11] , SHA-0 [9] and SHA-1 [10] ). Moreover the techniques can be applied to explore the second-preimage of MD4 [12] , forgery and partial key-recovery attacks on HMAC and NMAC [3, 4] . Kelsey and Schneier [5] provided a second preimage attack on the iterated hash functions with Merkle-Damgård strengthening, which shows a vulnerability of the Merkle-Damgård construction. Responding to advances in the cryptanalysis of hash functions, NIST held two hash workshops to evaluate the security of its approved hash functions and to solicit public comments on its cryptographic hash function policy and standard. Finally, NIST opened a public competition to develop a new hash function called "SHA-3", similar to the development process of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). There are 64 new proposals for hash functions have been submitted to the SHA-3 project, of which 51 submissions have come into the first round. In July, 2009, NIST has selected 14 second round candidates of the SHA-3. Luffa [2] is one of them, proposed by De Cannière, Sato and Watanabe.
In this paper, we give some cryptanalytic results of Luffa with free initial values. The pseudo-collision and pseudo-second-preimage can be obtained easily by the message injection function of Luffa, which only changes a few bits of the initial values. This paper shows a pseudo-collision and pseudo-second-preimage example for Luffa-256 and gives the actual attacks. For Luffa-224/256, only 2 iteration computations are needed to get the pseudo-preimage. A pseudo preimage example for Luffa-256 is shown in this paper, which only changes 2 256-bit words of the initial values with 3 256-bit words. We use the extended generalized birthday attack [7] to compute the pseudopreimage of Luffa-384 with 2 64 iteration computations and 2 64 table lookups. The time complexity and data complexity are both 2 128 to get the pseudo-preimage for Luffa-512.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we list some notations and give a brief description of Luffa. Section 3 shows the pseudo-collision and pseudo-secondpreimage attacks on Luffa. The pseudo-preimage attacks for Luffa is given in Section 4. The improved pseudo-preimage attacks for Luffa-384/512 are shown in Section 5. Finally, we summarize our results in Section 6.
Preliminaries and Notations
In this section, we first list some notations used in this paper, and then give a brief description of Luffa.
Notations

X Y
: the concatenation of two messages X and Y . h w (X) : the w most significant bits of X. l w (X) : the w least significant bits of X. ⌊a⌋ : the greatest integer less than or equal to a.
: left rotation of a by j bits.
Description of Luffa
Luffa [2] , a candidate algorithm for the second round of the SHA- 
Fig. 1. The Structure of Luffa Hash Function
Message Injection Function MI The message injection functions MI can be represented by the matrix over a field GF(2 8 ). The multiplication over the field GF(2 8 ) is modulo φ(x) = x 8 + x 4 + x 3 + x + 1, corresponding to "0x11b". The map from 8 32-bit words (h 0 , . . . , h 7 ) to 32 8-bit elements of the field is defined by
where the elements 0x1, 0x2, 0x3, 0x4 correspond to polynomials 1, x, x + 1, x 2 respectively. For Luffa-384,
0x4, 0x6, 0x6, 0x7, 0x1 0x7, 0x4, 0x6, 0x6, 0x2 0x6, 0x7, 0x4, 0x6, 0x4 0x6, 0x6, 0x7, 0x4, 0x8
For Luffa-512,
0x0F, 0x08, 0x0A, 0x0A, 0x08, 0x01 0x08, 0x0F, 0x08, 0x0A, 0x0A, 0x02 0x0A, 0x08, 0x0F, 0x08, 0x0A, 0x04 0x0A, 0x0A, 0x08, 0x0F, 0x08, 0x08 0x08, 0x0A, 0x0A, 0x08, 0x0F, 0x10
The Permutation Q j The permutation Q j is defined as a composition of an input tweak and 8 steps. Let a 0 , . . . , a 7 be the 256-bit input of the Q j , b 0 , . . . , b 7 be the output of tweak. The tweak is defined as follows:
After tweak, there are 8 steps in the permutation, and each step consists of the following three functions: SubCrumb, MixWord and AddConstant. SubCrumb is defined as:
where S denotes a S-box with 4-bit input and 4-bit output. MixWord is defined as:
We do not give the description for AddConstant since it has no impact on our cryptanalysis. For more details about Luffa, consult [2] .
Pseudo-Collision and Pseudo-Second-Preimage Attacks on Luffa
In this section, we give some cryptanalysis for Luffa when the initial value IV is free. Flipping 5 bits of IV for Luffa-256 is enough to get a pseudo-collision or pseudosecond-preimage. For Luffa-384, 7 bits of IV are needed to be changed to get a pseudocollision or pseudo-second-preimage. There is a 12-bit difference in the IV to get a pseudo-collision or pseudo-second-preimage for Luffa-512. This can be used to construct the related key attack for the corresponding MACs using the secret key as initial value.
For the message injection function MI, the input is (w + 1) 256-bit words, and the output is w 256-bit words. So, it is a many-to-one function. It is easy to know that, any w columns of the MI matrix consists of an invertible matrix. So there are exactly 2 256 inputs corresponding to any given output of MI. Given any MI output 
From the equations, it is easy to get
Let IV be the standard initial value, given a message M, the message
There are only 5 bits different between IV and IV ′ , which is minimum, when the message
Let the input difference be (∆H 0 , ∆H 1 , ∆H 2 , ∆H 3 , ∆M), and the output difference of
By the system of equations, we can deduce
There is a 7-bit difference in the initial values when
is the pseudo-preimage of the given message M, that is to say Luffa-384(IV, M)=Luffa-384(IV ′ , M ′ ).
Given the input difference of Luffa-512 (∆H 0 , ∆H 1 , ∆H 2 , ∆H 3 , ∆H 4 , ∆M) and < 32) , the number of bits with difference in the initial value is least, which is 12. Table 1 shows a pseudo-second-preimage example for the message M 0 = (0xaaaaaaaa, 0xaaaaaaaa, 0xaaaaaaaa, 0xaaaaaaaa, 0xaaaaaaaa, 0xaaaaaaaa, 0xaaaaaaaa, 0xaaaaaaaa).
From the above description, only a few bits are needed to be changed to get a collision pair or the second-preimage for a given message. It is obvious that we can directly construct the forgery attack on NMAC based on Luffa in the related key case, for the NMAC replaces the fixed IV in hash function with a secret key [1] . The NMAC function, on input message M and a pair of independent keys (K 1 , K 2 ), is defined as:
When H is the Luffa hash function, a forgery message M ⊕ ∆M with the same NMAC value as the message M in the related key case is given:
Where ∆M and ∆IV satisfy MI(∆IV, ∆M) = 0.
The Pseudo-Preimage Attack on Luffa
For Luffa-256, given a hash value Z 0 , the adversary can compute a pseudo-preimage with the following process. An example is shown in Table 2 with Z 0 = ¼. 
3. Because the message M = ¼ for the blank iteration, the adversary can compute
0x2, 0x3, 0x2 0x2, 0x2, 0x3
For the chaining variables
, the adversary computers (IV ′ 1 , IV ′ 2 , M) with the fixed IV 0 by the following equations,
0x3, 0x2, 0x2 0x2, 0x3, 0x4
which is the pseudo-preimage of Z 0 , i.e.,
Luffa-256(IV
There are w − 1 256-bit words changed of the initial value with w 256-bit words. For Luffa-384, the hash value consists of Z 0 cascaded with the 128 most significant bits of Z 1 , and
where Z 1,i for 0 ≤ i < 8 are 32-bit words. The adversary randomly chooses (H 0 , H 1 , H 2 ), and gets
and message M 0 which has the same hash value Z 0 Z 1,0 Z 1,1 Z 1,2 Z 1,3 , using the similar method with Luffa-256. The total complexity is 2 128 iteration computations. For Luffa-512, the complexity is 2 255 using a similar attack.
Improved Pseudo-Preimage Attacks on Luffa-384/512
In this section, we introduce an algorithm to improve the pseudo-preimage attack on Luffa-384/512 by the extended generalized birthday attack which is used to solve a system of equations, proposed by Schnorr [6] . The k-dimensional generalization of the birthday problem is, given k lists L 0 , L 1 , . . ., L k−1 independently at random from {0, 1} n , to find k elements x i ∈ L i for 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 such that x 0 ⊕ x 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ x k−1 = 0. Wagner's algorithm [7] builds a binary tree starting from the input lists L 0 , L 1 , . . ., L k−1 . The time complexity and data complexity are both t · 2 n 1+t , where t = ⌊log 2 k⌋.
The Extended Generalized Birthday Attack
We give a brief description of Wagner's generalized birthday attack in the following. Wagner's Algorithm. 
The adversary constructs 2 t sets S
The above algorithm can find one solution x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x k−1 such that x 0 ⊕x 1 · · ·⊕x k−1 = 0 with time complexity and data complexity being both t · 2 n 1+t . Now consider the solution to the following two equations instead of one equation.
where f i and g i (1 ≤ i ≤ k) are random functions, f i : 2 m → 2 n 1 , g i : 2 m → 2 n 2 . The equations (1) and (2) can be solved together by the extended generalized birthday attack [6] described in the following. It is easy to construct the following equation from equations (1) and (2):
For the new equation (3), the Wagner's algorithm can be applied to obtain x 1 , . . . , x k .
The data and time complexity is t · 2 n 1 +n 2 1+t , where t = ⌊log 2 k⌋ and m ≥ n 1 +n 2 1+t . It is clear that, the algorithm can be extended to solve more equations.
. . .
where f , where t = ⌊log 2 k⌋ and m ≥ n 1 +n 2 +···+n t 1+t .
The Improved Pseudo-Preimage Attack on Luffa-384
be the input of the last blank iteration function, and
be the output of its MI. The hash value is Z 0 Z 1 , whereZ 1 
From the message injection function MI, we know that
where A 4×4 is the first 4 column vectors of the matrix A 4×5 , i.e.,
0x4, 0x6, 0x6, 0x7 0x7, 0x4, 0x6, 0x6 0x6, 0x7, 0x4, 0x6 0x6, 0x6, 0x7, 0x4
It's inverse matrix is
0x20, 0x43, 0x84, 0x11 0x11, 0x20, 0x43, 0x84 0x84, 0x11, 0x20, 0x43 0x43, 0x84, 0x11, 0x20
where
Obviously, it is necessary for us to find the solution (X 0 , X 1 , X 2 , X 3 ) to make equations (4) and (5) hold together. We search the solution by the extended generalized birthday attack and some specific properties of Luffa. The algorithm is as follows.
1. The adversary constructs four sets such that,
where c 0 , c 1 are two 192-bit constants, and each set includes 2 64 elements. It is clear that,
The adversary searches the solution (X 0 , X 1 , X 2 , X 3 ) satisfying the following two equations by the extended generalized birthday attack.
where X i ∈ S i , i = 0, 1, 2, 3. It is clear that, The solution (X 0 , X 1 , X 2 , X 3 ) guarantees the equations (4) and (5) hold together. 3. For (X 0 , X 1 , X 2 , X 3 ), the adversary can calculate (IV 0 , IV ′ 1 , IV ′ 2 , IV ′ 3 ) and the message M, and get the pseudo-preimage using the similar pseudo-preimage attack on Luffa-256.
There are 2 64 Q 0 , Q 1 , Q 2 , Q 3 computations and 2 64 table lookups in the above algorithm. So the total complexity is about 2 64 iteration computations and 2 67 bytes memory.
The Improved Pseudo-Preimage Attack on Luffa-512
For Luffa-512, let (H 0 , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 , ¼) be the input of the last blank iteration function, and (X 0 , X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , X 4 ) be the output of MI. Then
For the message injection function MI, we know that,
where A 5×5 is the first 5 column vectors of the matrix A 5×6 , i.e.,
0x f , 0x8, 0xa, 0xa, 0x8 0x8, 0x f , 0x8, 0xa, 0xa 0xa, 0x8, 0x f , 0x8, 0xa 0xa, 0xa, 0x8, 0x f , 0x8 0x8, 0xa, 0xa, 0x8, 0x f
Its inverse matrix is
0xc7, 0x8b, 0x f 4, 0x f 4, 0x8b 0x8b, 0xc7, 0x8b, 0x f 4, 0x f 4 0x f 4, 0x8b, 0xc7, 0x8b, 0x f 4 0x f 4, 0x f 4, 0x8b, 0xc7, 0x8b 0x8b, 0x f 4, 0x f 4, 0x8b, 0xc7
We can search a solution to equations (6) and (7) by the extended generalized birthday attack and some specific properties of Luffa.
where c 0 , c 1 are two 128-bit constants, and each set includes 2 128 elements. It is clear that, l 128 (X 0 ⊕ X 1 ⊕ X 2 ⊕ X 3 ⊕ X 4 ) = l 128 (Z ′ 0 ). 2. The adversary searches a solution (X 0 , X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , X 4 ) satisfying the following two equations by the extended generalized birthday attack.
where X i ∈ S i , i = 0, 1, 2 and (X 3 , X 4 ) ∈ S 3 . It is clear that, The solution (X 0 , X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , X 4 ) guarantees equations (6) and (7) hold. 3. For (X 0 , X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , X 4 ), the adversary can calculate (IV 0 , IV ′ 1 , IV ′ 2 , IV ′ 3 , IV ′ 4 ) and the message M, and get the pseudo-preimage using the similar pseudo-preimage attack on Luffa-256.
The total complexity is about 2 128 iteration computations and 2 132 bytes memory.
Conclusion
In this paper, we give pseudo-collision, pseudo-second-preimage and pseudo-preimage attacks on Luffa, one of the second round candidates of SHA-3. For any given output of the message injection function MI, it is easy to get the input to MI using the inverse operation of MI. So we can find pseduo-collisions and pseudo-second-preimages easily for Luffa by applying the MI property. It is noted that, the pseudo-collisions and pseudosecond-preimages only with a few different bits are easily searched. The attack can be directly converted to a forgery attack on NMAC with related keys.
Especially, we focus on the the pseudo-preimage attack on Luffa. For Luffa-224/256, the attack can find the the pseudo-preimage only with 2 iteration computations. It takes about 2 64 iteration computations and 2 67 bytes memory to search a pseudo-preimage for Luffa-384, and search a pseudo-preimage with 2 128 iteration computations and 2 132 bytes memory for Luffa-512 with the extended generalized birthday attack.
